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Stigma and Risky Behaviors Among Male Clients of Sex Workers in the UK in 2001 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Sex work is an activity carried out by women, men, and transgender mostly, although not 
exclusively, to cater for male demand. It has been widely studied in the social sciences along a 
variety of dimensions including violence, immigration and sex tourism (Susanne Thorbek and 
Bandana Pattanaik 2002, Jacqueline Sanchez Taylor and Julia O'Connell Davidson., 2010), 
identity and rights (Joanna Brewis and Stephen Linstead, 2000, Gail Pheterson, 1995), drug 
abuse, HIV risks and regulatory concerns (Marina Della Giusta and Vanessa Munro, 2008; Jane 
Scoular, 2010). Many social scientists have also taken a critical approach to the rhetoric around 
trafficking and slavery (Julia O`Connell Davidson 2014, Ronald Weitzer 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 
Kamala Kempadoo, Jyoti Sanghera, Bandana Pattanaik 2011, Laura Agustin 2007).  
 
The economic literature has also approached a number of issues related to both selling and 
buying sex: prices and supply characteristics (Samuel Cameron, Alan Collins and Neill Thew et 
al 1999; Peter Moffatt and Simon Peters 2001; Lena Edlund and Evelyn Korn 2002; Samuel 
Cameron, 2002), demand determinants (Samuel Cameron and Alan Collins 2003), health risks 
and the effect of condom use on sex workers’ earnings (Vijayendra Rao, Indrani Gupta, 
Michael Lokshin and Smarajit Jana 2001; Paul Gertler, Manisha Shah and Stefano Bertozzi 
2003), the evolution of paid sex markets and the ways in which urban spaces favor sexual 
transactions (Alan Collins 2004), the effect of men in transit on the demand for paid sex (Scott 
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Cunningham and Todd Kendall, 2011), the connections with trafficking (Maura Laura Di 
Tommaso, Isilda Shima, Steinar Strøm and Francesca Bettio 2009), the role of asymmetric 
information and transaction costs in bargaining over price and working conditions (Debra Satz 
2010; Neha Hui 2012; Amy Farmer and Andrew Horowitz 2013).  
Economic studies focusing on sex workers have engaged with compensation as partly reflecting 
compensation for social exclusion, risk (violence, disease, arrest, punishment), front loading in 
wage profile (informal pension scheme or insurance), boredom and physical effort, distaste 
(potential psychological and physical costs), loss of recreational sex pleasure, and anti-social and 
inconvenient hours. Economists have discussed prices, risks for both sex workers and clients, the 
role of taboos, and of agent fees (Cameron, 2002). 
 
 More controversially, the wages of sex workers have been described as 'high' for a 'low skill' 
occupation and explained by the loss of position in the marriage market (Edlund and Korn, 
2002). The latter work motivated our earlier papers in which we showed that stigma is 
fundamentally related to the nature of the transaction between sex workers and clients, and that 
clients do not simply demand sex (or companionship as recently discussed by Teela Sanders, 
2008), but also a form of control and part of the construction of the client identity (Marina Della 
Giusta, Maria Laura Di Tommaso, and Steinar Strøm 2009a, Coy et al, 2007), and this appears to 
be true of existing studies of female clients (for recent evidence see Bauer, 2014). Gender is in 
this sense not the only dimension that matters to the transaction, as the literature discussed in 
what follows illustrates how race and ethnicity are also used to construct social distance between 
clients and sex workers and it is in this sense that our model is helpful, given that it does not 
explicitly state that the client is a male and the sex worker a female, which would obscure the 
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vast male sex work market, the significant market for couples buying sexual services and the 
small but nonetheless relevant 'romance holiday' and escort market for female clients. 
Attitudes towards the exchange of paid sex fundamentally shape the dynamics of demand and 
supply and the resulting markets as they affect regulation, location, prices, and risk for both sex 
workers and clients, as well as the institutional form of organisation of the trade (brothels, pimps, 
escort services etc.) and the entry mode (including trafficking). Stigma has always been 
associated with sex work from Victorian concerns with the evil personality of sex workers to the 
concern prevalent from the nineteenth century of sex workers as victims (Ine Vanwesenbeeck 
2001), and partly associated with sex of a non-reproductive nature which is seen as threatening 
marriage (Simone de Beauvoir, 1949). More recent debates have focused on objectification of 
the body and whether the selling the body and the selling of the self are inextricably linked 
(Caroline Pateman 1983; Martha Nussbaum 1999) and feminist debates on the issue have been 
heated with strong divisions between pro-sex work and abolitionist camps. 
 
Although there are papers in the literature addressing the effect of stigma on supply (Lena 
Edlund, Joseph Engelberg and Christopher Parsons 2009 on escorts and Sara Peracca, John 
Knodel and Chanpen Saengtienchai 1998 on Thai sex workers’ ability to remarry), little work has 
addressed the effect it has on demand. Eileen V. Pitpitan et al. 2015 measure perceived stigma
1
 of 
purchasing sex among Latino and non-Latino male clients of female sex workers in Tijuana, 
Mexico. They find that stigma is higher among the Latino than the non -Latino population. Using 
                                                 
1
 Stigma is measured as an index based on the following 3 questions: ‘‘People will treat me differently if they find 
out that I go to prostitutes;’’ ‘‘Most people look down on men who go to prostitutes;’’ and ‘‘Most people think that 
men who go to prostitutes are bad people.’ 
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linear regression analyses, they found that perceived stigma was associated with greater guilt, a 
greater feeling of escape from everyday life, and more negative condom attitudes among Latino 
clients. These findings were not found among non-Latino clients. 
 
The model of sex work proposed by Della Giusta et al. (2009a),  is in the standard rational action 
tradition (based on the idea that agents make decisions based on the information available to 
them and having evaluated possible alternatives), but builds on the literature on social 
interactions (Mark Granovetter 1985; Pierre Bordieu 1986; James Coleman 1988; Charles 
Mansky 2000) and social sanctions (George Akerlof 1980; Richard Arnott and Joseph Stiglitz 
1991), and discusses stigma as a loss of reputation which affects social standing for both clients 
and sex workers, as well as pay and working conditions in the sex trade and access to services 
and other jobs for sex workers. The model also incorporates personal differences in concern for 
reputation depending on agents’ personal characteristics and the specific moment at which they 
exercise choice (so that people are allowed to differ and also to be inconsistent in their choices). 
This is important in order to describe situations of individuals with high reputation who disregard 
the effects of their actions, which would be otherwise construed as irrational behavior. We 
considered both the case in which reputational endowments are exogenous (that is not affected 
by behavior within the sex industry) and the situation when those endowments are considered 
endogenous, that is a situation in which if a higher quantity of sexual services is sold or bought 
in the economy the stigma effect decreases. Marina Della Giusta, Maria Laura Di Tommaso, 
Isilda Shima and Steinar Strøm (2009b) attempted to test some of the predictions of their model 
in an empirical exercise using data from a survey of US clients of street sex workers, which 
although wide in its scope contained only clients. In this paper, we look explicitly at how 
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attitudes and risky behaviors affect demand for paid sex in a sample drawn from the British 
National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles (Natsal) conducted in 2000-2001 by the 
Centre for Sexual Health and HIV Research at University College London, interviewing 12,110 
people aged 16-44 years. As this sample contains both clients and non-clients and is 
representative of the population, the results we infer are more robust for policy prescriptions 
because they can be generalised to the wider population. A set of recent studies conducted by 
Niklas Jakobsson and Andrea Kotsadam (2011) using Swedish and Norwegian data is to our 
knowledge the only other attempt at addressing the role of attitudes in demand for paid sex, and 
we compare wherever possible our results to theirs. 
 
2. The determinants of demand 
Findings from empirical studies of clients suggest that personal characteristics (personal and 
family background, self-perception, perceptions of women, sexual preferences), economic 
factors (education, income, work), as well as attitudes towards risk (health hazard and risk of 
being caught where sex work is illegal), lack of interest in conventional relationships, desire for 
variety in sexual acts or sexual partners, and viewing sex as a commodity, are all likely to affect 
demand. Cameron and Collins (2003) model male clients’ decision to enter the market for sexual 
services, where he has the choice to derive utility from one relationship partner and/or one paid 
sex partner. They distinguish between the motivations of men in relationships (variety, specific 
acts, frequency, outlet for stress) and single men (‘relative search costs of finding willing sexual 
partners, or partners willing to engage in specific sexual activities in an ad hoc or formal social 
context, and in a given time period.’). Marian Pitts, Anthony Smith, Mary O’Brien, and 
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Sebastian Misson (2004) surveyed a sample of 1225 men and women in Australia
2
  and found 
that 23.4% had paid for sex at least once. They reported paying for sex to satisfy sexual needs 
(43.8%), because paying for sex is less trouble (36.4%), and because it is entertaining (35.5%). 
Significantly, the researchers found that there were not many significant differences between 
men who had paid for sex and those who had not, except that the ones who had were on average 
older, less likely to have university education and to have had a regular partner in the previous 
year.  
The motivations of sex workers’ clients in the UK have been the subject of extensive study by 
Teela Sanders in her Paying for Pleasure (2008), and included a wide range of issues including 
demand for variety but also difficulty with relationships and demand for companionship, and a 
widespread concern with shame, especially but not exclusively for those in relationships. Similar 
findings are reported by Maddie Coy, Miranda Horvath and Liz Kelly (2007) on buyers of sex in 
East London,
3
 as well as by Rosie Campbell (1998). This is confirmed by Thorbek and Pattanaik 
(2002), who draw a sort of “psychological” profile of male sex tourists on the basis of their own 
descriptions of themselves and accounts of their experiences. This indicates that many of them 
are finding relationships with others very difficult (either because they do not have the time or 
the skills required to meet people) and choose sex tourism as an “easier” alternative, which does 
not imply any responsibility towards the person providing the sexual service. As for the views 
                                                 
2 
 
The sample was taken by distributing a survey to customers of a Sexpo exhibition hold in Melbourne in 2001. 
This is a commercial event hosting a wide range of exhibitors of products associated with sex; of 4.905 
respondents, 1225 received a version of the questionnaires with questions on sex workers. Among 1225 
respondents, 612 were men and 601 were women.  
3 
http://www.cwasu.org/displayAuthorsPublications.asp?author_key=51  
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they held of sex workers, it appears that both sexism and racism mix in determining a very 
marked distancing, which allow sex tourists to practically ignore and show no interest in the lives 
and working motivations of the sex workers whose services they buy.  
Wider phenomena connected to consumerism and globalization are also clearly related to this 
industry, which reflects multiple power structures: Anna-Maria Marttila (2003) concludes from 
her study of Finnish clients that: “the sex business is first and foremost about gendered, 
economic, social and cultural – global and local – power structures.” (Marttila 2003, 8).  Thus, 
different intersections of gender, race and class all contribute to the creation of ‘othering’ 
mechanisms that serve to both distance the parties to an exchange and justify the assertion of 
economic power within it. This phenomenon is obviously not limited to paid sex exchanges, and 
has been widely documented across a range of personal services.  
Stigma is not just at play with men: women clients are also engaging in sex tourism, as 
documented both in Thorbek and Pattanaik (2002), and in Jacqueline Sanchez Taylor (2001). The 
latter, in particular, offers a more in-depth analysis of North American and Northern European 
women buying sex work services of young men in the Caribbean, in what they themselves 
describe as ‘romance holidays’. Responses to her interviews suggest that, on the one hand, 
women clients are mostly reluctant to define what they engage in as sex work, and, on the other, 
that their ideas about the young men whose service they buy are deeply rooted in racist ideas 
about black men and black men’s sexuality. The theme of inequality appears to be at the core of 
the relationship: prejudices that allow the stigmatization of another person as fundamentally 
“different” and inferior to oneself appear again and again in customers’ accounts (Hanny Ben-
Israel and Numi Levenkron 2005; Pitts et al 2004; Roger Kern 2000; Karen Blanchard 1994).  
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Studies have recently begun to appear that address more explicitly attitudes towards sex work 
and their relationship to regulatory regimes: Jari Kuosmanen (2011) reviews existing studies of 
attitudes to sex work in Sweden finding more support for criminalization as a result of the 
introduction of the law, and also conducts a random sample study finding more support for the 
current Swedish law among women and younger respondents and a small effect of higher 
education on women’s attitudes. Jahnsen (2008), reviewed in Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2011) 
finds for Norway that women and those living in the capital region are more in favor of 
criminalizing clients, as are feminists, left-wing sympathizers, and Christians. Jakobsson and 
Kotsadam (2011) use data for Norway and Sweden find that men and sexual liberals are more 
positive toward sex work, that both conservatives and those supporting gender equality are more 
negative, and that holding anti-immigration views is correlated with more positive attitudes 
toward buying sex. These studies do not link attitudes towards sex work to the actual demand for 
paid sex because they do not have information about the demand for paid sex. Therefore, they 
cannot observe the correlation between holding conservative views and demand for paid sex but 
only between holding conservative views and attitudes towards sex work. In our paper, on the 
contrary, we can observe this correlation between having conservative views and demanding 
paid sex (see Section 4 and 5). 
 
3. The theoretical model 
 
The theoretical basis for the present paper is an economic model of sex work developed in 
Della Giusta et al (2009a), which incorporates both stigma and inequality between client and sex 
worker. Stigma is modelled as the effect on reputation from participating in this market, and we 
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use insights on modelling reputations from both the economic and sociological literature 
(Granovetter, 1985; Bordieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Mansky, 2000), which point to two distinct 
ways in which reputations matter to economic agents: firstly, because as social beings they 
derive utility from a positive evaluation by others in the social groups they belong to (Mark 
Casson 1991), and secondly, because they are aware of the costs that social sanctions may 
impose on their material progress (Akerlof 1980; Arnott and Stiglitz 1991). Reputation has thus 
both intrinsic and instrumental value: it is desired per-se (provider of utility) and can be used to 
access other earning opportunities. Stigma is a loss of reputation, which can affect social 
standing. Following Akerlof (1980), we include reputation in agents’ preferences in our model 
and allow agents to have a different concern for their reputation depending on their personal 
characteristics and the specific moment at which they exercise choice. The demand for sex in 
general and the demand for sex with a sex worker are not considered perfect substitutes 
reflecting the fact that clients’ may have other motivations when buying sex,  something we aim 
to explore empirically in the present paper.  
Focusing on the demand side of the model, and following Della Giusta et al (2009b), let 
(1)  U (S0, S, C, r, X)  
denote the utility of buying sex. S0 is the amount of freely exchanged sex that the client has, 
whereas S is the amount of sex that the client has with sex workers. Amounts of sex can be 
measured in terms of number of sexual events (number of visits) during a certain period. C is 
consumption of other goods and services than sex, r is a variable related to reputation and stigma 
effects, and X is a vector of individual characteristics. The utility function is assumed to be 
increasing in {S0, S, C, r} and strictly quasi-concave.  
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Let w denote the price per event with a sex worker and let I denote disposable income. The 
budget constraint is given by 
(2)  I=wS+C. 
 
We define a variable, Lr, as the capacity for reputational losses. Lr is given for each 
individual and it depends on his professional status, his position in the community, and his 
marital status. A judge, a politician, or a priest has a low capacity for reputational losses (a low 
Lr) because he is vulnerable reputation-wise. Even a small amount of paid sex can ruin his 
reputation potential.  
A high Lr means that clients have little to lose reputation-wise i.e. they have a higher 
capacity for reputation losses. An individual with a low social status may have a high Lr. 
A reputation loss can also include the intrinsic feelings of shame and guilt that result from 
buying sex, especially if the buyer is being unfaithful to a partner. Thus, we may assume that a 
partnered person has a lower capacity for reputational losses, Lr, than a single.  
Individual reputation (r) is reduced when sex is bought in the market. We do not model the 
probability of being seen as a client; therefore, we assume that when sex is bought it is also 
observable in the community
4
. So we define individual reputation (r) equals to the capacity for 
reputational losses (Lr) minus the amount of sex bought on the market (S): 
                                                 
4
 This is a limitation in our theoretical model. We could include in the model a probability of 
being caught. Then the capacity for reputational losses (Lr) would not be reduced by the amount 
of paid sex (S) but by a probability of being caught. In the empirical part, this could be a function 
of the intensity of policing in different towns/districts. In UK, different districts have different 
regulations and different resources to contrast kerb crawling. Pitpitan et al. 2015 have found that 
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(3)         
 Given that the utility function is assumed to be increasing in {S0, S, C, r} the higher the 
capacity for reputation loss (Lr), the higher the utility. From (1) we note that paid sex and freely 
exchanged sex may be substitutes from a client’s point of view.  
Given that sex is bought, which means that the client has passed a threshold of buying sex, 
the amount of sex bought that maximizes utility (1) under the constraint (2) and (3) is given by 
the following demand function 
(4)   S=f (w,I,R,S0,X)  
Substituting the constraint 3 into 4 yields the reduced form: 
(5) S = f (w, I, Lr, S0,X) 
We thus expect that the amount of sex bought is decreasing in the price w, increasing in 
income and in the capacity for reputation losses. If demand for paid sex decreases with regular 
sex, S0, paid sex and free sex are substitutes. Otherwise they are complements.  
Della Giusta et al. (2009b) explored empirically whether the assumptions regarding the 
motivations for demand are valid, by developing an econometric model of client’s demand with 
data from a US survey of clients of street sex workers. They analyzed the demand for paid sex 
using an ordered logit where the dependent variable was the number of times the client paid for 
sex in a year. Among the explanatory variables were personal characteristics, attitudes towards 
                                                                                                                                                             
Latino clients in Mexico who reported greater stigma also reported a greater preference of having 
sex with a female sex worker in a setting where there is risk of getting arrested, whereas non-
Latino clients reported the opposite.  
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sex workers, and preferences for relationships. The results of their empirical analysis confirm the 
behavioural assumptions behind the theoretical framework: stigmatisation of clients and sex 
workers are important characteristics of this market (as reflected in the attitudes of clients in the 
sample towards sex work, towards sex workers, and towards being caught), demand for paid and 
unpaid sex are indeed not perfect substitutes, they vary according to personal profiles and 
attitudes (especially regarding power asymmetries between clients and sex workers). There 
appear to be two distinct groups of clients whose personal characteristics and attitudes are 
radically opposite: experimenters, to whom street sex work is a complement to stable 
relationships, and who hold negative views of women, of sex work, and of sex workers; and 
regulars, who hold more liberal views, they like variety and find relationships a burden, and view 
paid sex as a normal good whose demand increases with income. The experimenters demand for 
sex increases with the need for control
5
, while for regulars the opposite applies. Risk aversion is 
also correlated to our two client profiles, with experimenters being more risk loving and regulars 
more risk averse.  
The main problem in Della Giusta et al. (2009b) is the selection bias in the data. In fact the 
data were collected among arrested male clients of female street sex workers in four USA cities 
(San Francisco, Portland, Las Vegas, Santa Chiara). Arrested clients who agreed to participate in 
an intervention program, were asked to fill a questionnaire. The data therefore had three levels of 
selection: individuals in the sample were the ones who were caught, agreed to participate to the 
re-habilitation program, and filled in the form. Therefore the results from that empirical study are 
strongly biased.  
                                                 
5  This is the clients’ reply to the following question: “ Do you like to be in control when you are having sex?”. For 
more details see Della Giusta et al. (2009b). 
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The innovative approach of this paper consists in the use of a data set focusing on attitudes 
and risky behaviors that contains representative information of the entire British population, 
containing both clients and non-clients. 
 
4. Data set and modeling strategy 
 
In this paper we utilize the  British National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles 
(Natsal II) conducted by the Centre for Sexual Health and HIV Research at University College 
London (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/sexual-health/research/sex-attitudes.htm).  This is the second cross 
section of a series of surveys, of which the first was conducted in 1990-91. The sample size is 
12,110 individuals aged 16-44 interviewed in the period 2000-2001, living in private households. 
The data were collected through face-to-face interviews. 
For the purpose of this paper we selected only male individuals, because only men were 
asked whether they had paid for sex
6
. Moreover we selected only men between age 26 and 44. 
We assume that young men could still be studying which could introduce some bias in the 
estimates of the education and professional variables. The resulting sample includes 3,084 
observations. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the main advantage of this data set with respect to the ones utilized for 
previous studies is that it is a national representative sample of sexual attitudes and it includes 
questions on paying for sex. This implies the possibility of studying clients versus non-clients 
                                                 
6 
 
We underline that it would be important in the future to ask the same questions about paying for sex to women, 
given the increasing female demand for paid sex (Irmgard Bauer, 2014; Thorbek and Pattanaik; 200;, Sanchez 
Taylor; 2001). 
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while most papers (including Della Giusta et al. 2009b) analyze clients with data sets that only 
contains clients. We define a client in our dataset as a man who declares to have paid for sex at 
least once. A drawback of our data is that there are no questions related to frequency of paid 
sexual encounters. The questions regard only if the (male) individual has ever paid for 
homosexual or heterosexual sex, and with how many sex workers
7
. In the following, we estimate 
a probit model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the man has ever paid for sex, and 
include all the variables reported in Table 1 as explanatory variables we discuss the chosen 
variables next. We also estimate a multinomial probit for three categories of men: non-clients, 
experimenter (paid to have sex with 1 person) and regulars (paid to have sex with more than 1 
person), so we can check if our results are driven by experimenters or regulars.  
 
In order to test the model presented in Section 3, we need some variables related to 
individual income, price of paid sex, capacity for reputation losses, amount of freely exchanged 
sex and other personal characteristics.  
Unfortunately the British National Survey on Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles does not 
contain data on income or price for paid sex. In order to have a proxy for income we use data on 
educational levels and number of children (a higher number of children implies less disposable 
income to be spent on paid sex). Educational is captured by four categories, reflecting the UK 
education system: university degree level qualification, A-levels (below higher education level 
but above high school level), O-levels (high school qualification level) and no education.  
In addition, we assume that the variables related to professional status (captured by 
respondent’s social class) are a proxy for reputation capacity or stigma. We assume that men with 
a high professional status (managers or professionals) have a small capacity for reputation losses 
                                                 
7  Table A1 in Appendix 1 show descriptive statistics for the total number of people paid for sex.  
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(Lr ) and therefore that their reputations can be easily damaged. Professional status and 
educational levels are correlated but the correlation is not very high
8
. In the estimated model, we 
provide different specifications excluding either professional status or educational level. We are 
aware that the estimation could suffer from omitted variables bias and therefore we include as a 
proxy for omitted variables also the professional status of men’s parents (for the descriptive 
statistics of these variables see Table 1).
9
  
In order to test if paying for sex is correlated with risky behavior, we use five questions 
related to: sex with foreign partners, unsafe sex, smoking habits, use of injected drugs, and 
alcohol consumption.  
The hypothesis that there is a correlation between demand for paid sex and free sex is tested 
using three variables: number of heterosexual partners in the last year, number of occasions of 
heterosexual sex in the last 4 weeks and a dummy for marriage or co-habitation. 
Finally, we included some dummies for age of first heterosexual intercourse because the 
sociological literature on clients (Sanders 2008) shows that paying for sex is more frequent 
among those individuals who had their first intercourse at a younger age. We also included age of 
clients. We expect this variable to be positively correlated with paying for sex because in 
previous studies age was an important determinant of the demand for paid sex (Della Giusta et al 
2009b). 
 
 
                                                 
8  See correlation matrix in Table A2 of Appendix 1 
9  The parent’s social class measure in the dataset had fewer categories than the respondents social class with 
partly skilled and unskilled group together, which as we did for own social class we grouped with the 
employed/unclassifiable category. 
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Some descriptive statistics of our variables, with a split by clients and non -clients are 
provided in table 1. We now discuss the main differences between clients and non-clients. 
 
TABLE 1 APPROXIMATLY HERE 
  
Men who have paid for sex constitute 12.9 percent of our sample. Since our sample is 
representative of the entire British population between age 26 and 44, we can infer that 13 
percent of British men have paid for sex at least once in their life. Moreover, we notice that 
clients are on average 34.9 years old, while non-clients are on average 34.8 years old. Given that 
a client is defined as a man who has paid for sex at least once in his life, age is expected to be 
positively related to being a client. Nevertheless, the difference is small and not significantly 
different from zero, probably because the sample only includes men below 44 years old. A 
previous study of US clients (Della Giusta et al 2009b) shows that age is positively correlated 
with paying for sex. We can therefore reasonably expect that if the dataset had included older 
men, the percentage of men who have ever paid for sex would increase above 13 percent. 
Educational levels are different for clients and non-clients. Clients have higher levels of 
education with respect to non-clients, with clients (16 percent compared to 13 percent of non-
clients) more likely to have A-levels or equivalent and the variable for no-education significantly 
different between client and non-clients. Among the clients only 13 percent do not have any 
education, while this is the case for 17 percent of the non-clients. 
Table 1 also shows that there are more un-skilled and partly skilled among clients than 
among non-clients, even if the differences are only significantly different for the unskilled. For 
instance, 7 percent of the clients are unskilled, while this is the case for only 5 percent of the 
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non-clients. We note, the higher the professional status, the higher the age of first heterosexual 
intercourse (see table A3 in appendix 1 for some descriptive statistics by professional status). 
Clients have on average 0.3 children less than non-clients. Moreover, Table 1 shows that 
clients are on average less risk averse than non-clients (differences are statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level); they smoke more (45 percent of clients have smoked compared to 37 percent 
of non-clients), they had more unsafe sex last year (13 percent of clients against 6 percent of 
non-clients), and they use more drugs (6 percent of clients have ever injected drugs as opposed to 
3 percent of non-clients).   Clients are also on average more likely to have a high or medium 
level of alcohol consumption (19 percent as opposed to 13 percent). 
Finally, 61 percent of clients are married or co-habiting as opposed to 75 percent of non-
clients. 
Clients had less heterosexual sex in the last 4 weeks (significantly different at the 10% 
level), but they had more sex partners in the last year. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
We utilize a probit model to estimate the probability of a man having ever paid for sex. The 
results of the probit model for demand of paid sex are reported in Table 2. We report the marginal 
effects, and the standard errors for three specifications of the model. Whilst one can interpret the 
sign and significance of the coefficients of a probit model, the magnitude of the raw coefficients 
are not intuitive, therefore we report average marginal effects (an average across marginal effects 
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for each individual) which provides the effect of a change in an explanatory variable on the 
probability of having paid for sex.  
Specification (1) include all the variables described in table 1; in order to test the interaction 
between education and professional status we also estimate two different specifications: in 
specification 2 and 3 we omit respectively education dummies and professional status dummies. 
Results show that the model is robust to different specifications. The main differences between 
the three specifications consist of the magnitude for the education and professional status. This 
reduction in magnitude is due to the correlation between education and professional status and 
omitting one of them implies omitting relevant variables and introducing a bias. In commenting 
on the results, we concentrate on specification,1, our preferred specification. 
  
TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
 Age has the expected (positive) sign which confirms previous results (Della Giusta et al. 
2009b). Each year increases the probability of ever having paid for sex by 0.5 percent points. The 
positive effect of age does not necessarily means that older men demand more paid sex; this 
result could also be due to a longer spell of life for older men and therefore it is more likely that 
they have paid for sex in the course of their life. 
One more child decreases the probability of having paid for sex by 1.4 percent points. This 
effect could be due to both an income effect and a time constraint. 
The education dummies, that we use as a proxy for income, are significantly different from 
zero; having a university degree increases the probability of having paid for sex by 7 percent 
points with respect to those with no education;   having O-levels (the equivalent of a high school 
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diploma) increases the probability of having paid for sex by 4 percent points with respect to 
those with no education. 
 The variables related to the professional status show that the higher the status of the client, 
the lower the probability of paying for sex. These variables are interpreted in our models as 
representative of the reputation capacity (Lr ). In our theoretical model, we defined a capacity for 
reputational loss, which is lower for individuals with a high status (judges, politicians) than for 
others. In our empirical estimation, we interpret the negative sign associated with professional 
status as a confirmation that stigma and reputation matter for the demand for paid sex. 
Individuals with a professional/managerial position are 9 percentage points less likely to pay for 
sex than unskilled individuals.  
The three different specifications show how the signs and significance for education and 
professional status variables do not change with the omission of either education or status. All 
the other coefficients do not change much across the three specifications. 
The indicators for risky behavior show there is a high correlation among different types of 
risky behavior and paying for sex; for instance, smokers have a probability of paying for sex 
which is 2 percent points higher than for non-smokers (significant at the 10% level). Having 
injected drugs implies a probability of paying for sex which is 6 percent higher than for those 
who have not injected drugs. We find similar effects for alcohol consumption and unsafe sex. 
 
We also find a negative and significant effect from the frequency of sex in the last 4 weeks, 
which confirms the hypothesis of a partial substitution effect between free and paid sex. The 
number of new heterosexual partners in the last year is positively and significantly related to the 
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demand for paid sex, confirming that another component may be the desire for variety (as in 
Cameron and Collins, 2003). Being married or co-habiting is not statistically significant. 
Having had the first intercourse between 13 and 15 years old increases the probability of 
having paid for sex by 5 percentage points. 
Having conservative views regarding abortion, homosexuality or sex before marriage is not 
significantly correlated with having paid for sex. Also the effect on paying for sex of belonging 
to a religion is not significantly different from zero. These results confirm that there is often a 
double standard regarding attitudes towards sex work: while on one hand the most conservative 
groups hold the most prohibitionist views on sex work, on the other hand they do not demand 
less paid sex with respect to the less conservative groups in society. This is consistent with the 
view that while there are differences in attitudes between those who are religious and those who 
are not, there are no significant differences in their actions regarding paying for sex. This may be 
seen to run counter to the results in Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2011), who find a connection 
between degree of conservatism and views on sex work, though they do not connect degree of 
conservatism to actual demand as we are doing here. They test the effect of being religious and 
being from the right or the left on attitudes towards sex work among a representative sample of 
Norwegians and Swedes. 
We also estimate a multinomial probit for three categories of men: non-clients, experimenter 
(paid to have sex with 1 person) and regulars (paid to have sex with more than 1 person), as a 
check to see if our results are driven by experimenters or regulars. Of our sample of clients, 41% 
are experimenters (164) and 59% are regulars (234). 
 
TABLE 3 APPROXIMATLY HERE 
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Table 3 shows the main results for this multinomial probit model for which we report 
average marginal effects. It seems that most of the results are driven by regulars rather than by 
experimenters, although those who have had unsafe sex or smoke are more likely to be 
experimenters whilst drugs and alcohol are more likely to be correlated with regulars.  
Our results can be compared with Della Giusta et al. (2009b). The main difference between 
their model and the one presented in this paper is that we can include the category of non-clients. 
In terms of results, the main differences regard the professional status and the education 
variables. In Della Giusta et al (2009b) they were not significantly different from zero while, in 
table 3, we show that education is positively correlated with being a regular client and the higher 
the professional status the less likely is to be a regular client. Moreover, the added value of this 
model is to show that both education and professional status matters (in opposite ways) in order 
to enter the market (i.e. to become a client), as shown in the probit of table 2. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper builds on existing theoretical work on sex markets (Della Giusta, Di 
Tommaso, and Strøm, 2009a). Using data from the British Survey on Sexual Attitudes and 
Lifestyles for 2001, we replicate the analysis of the demand for paid sex previously conducted 
for the US (Della Giusta, Di Tommaso, Shima and Strøm, 2009b). In fact one of the main 
limitations of this previous paper was the lack of a national representative sample with data 
collected among clients who had been arrested and agreed to participate to a rehabilitation 
program. This self-selection problem meant the estimates were biased. The estimates presented 
in this paper are not biased in this way, because they are based on a national representative 
sample, which contains both clients and non-clients. In this representative sample, 13 percent of 
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British men have paid for sex at least once in their lifetime. Moreover, the data set utilized in this 
paper allows us to explore the determinants for entering the market while the data utilized in 
previous papers could not.  
 We test the effect of attitudes, risky behaviors and personal characteristics on the demand 
for paid sex. Findings from empirical studies of clients suggest that personal characteristics 
(personal and family background, self-perception, perceptions of women, sexual preferences), 
economic factors (education, income, work) as well as attitudes towards risk (both health hazard 
and risk of being caught where sex work is illegal), and attitudes towards relationships and sex 
are all likely to affect demand.  Previous theoretical work has argued that stigma plays a 
fundamental role in determining both demand and risk, and that, due to the presence of stigma 
effects when paying for sex, the demand for unpaid and paid sex is not, as argued elsewhere, 
perfect substitutes.  
 We find a positive effect of education (proxy for income). As for the variables that our 
theoretical model had focused on, we do indeed find that stigma matters as the dummy reflecting 
professional status is negatively and significantly related to demand suggesting that professionals 
may indeed worry about the effect of paying for sex on their reputation. Risky behaviours are 
found to be positively and significantly related to demand; alcohol use, unsafe sex, smoking and 
drugs use are all positively and significantly related to demand for paid sex, which confirms the 
view that part of the demand is motivated by the thrill of engaging in risky behavior. We also 
find no significant effects of variables which measure the relative degree of conservatism in 
morals.    
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The policy implications from these findings are not straightforward and more analysis is 
needed to be able to offer robust suggestions. However, it seems clear that stigma plays a role in 
demand (at least the stigma potentially suffered by a client), as does attitudes to risk.  
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Table 1: Average values of the variables used in the probit of table 2 for 399 clients and 2685 
non-clients (3084 British men).  
  All Means   
  Mean St.Dev Min Max 
Clients 
Non-
client  
Age 34.81 5.25 26 44 34.89 34.8  
Number of children 1.15 1.26 0 8 0.89 1.19 *** 
Education dummies       
=1 if degree level qualification; =0 otherwise  0.27 0.45 0 1 0.3 0.27  
= 1 if a-levels/as-levels/slc higher grade; =0 
otherwise 
0.12 0.32 0 1 
0.16 0.11 *** 
=1 if o-level/other; =0 otherwise 0.44 0.5 0 1 0.42 0.44  
=1 if no education; =0 otherwise 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.13 0.17 ** 
Professional status       
=1 if professional/managerial; =0 otherwise 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.08 0.09  
=1 if technical/managerial; =0 otherwise 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.34 0.34  
=1 if skilled manual or non-manual; =0 otherwise 0.41 0.49 0 1 0.39 0.41  
=1 if partly skilled; =0 otherwise 0.11 0.32 0 1 0.13 0.11  
=1 if unskilled; =0 otherwise 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.07 0.05 ** 
Risky behavior       
=1 if had partner outside UK in the last 5 years; =0 
otherwise 
0.14 0.35 0 1 
0.33 0.11 *** 
=1 if had unsafe het. sex in last year; =0 otherwise 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.13 0.06 *** 
=1 if ever a smoker; =0 otherwise 0.38 0.49 0 1 0.45 0.37 *** 
=1 if ever injected drugs or other substances; =0 
otherwise 
0.03 0.18 0 1 
0.06 0.03 *** 
=1 if high or medium alcohol consumption; =0 
otherwise 
0.14 0.35 0 1 
0.2 0.13 *** 
Free sex        
Number of new het. sex partners, last year 0.57 1.82 0 55 1.35 0.45 *** 
Number of occasions of het. sex in last 4 weeks 5.49 6.01 0 56 5.12 5.54 * 
=1 if married or cohabiting or widow or divorced;  0.73 0.44 0 1 0.61 0.75 *** 
=0 if single & never married      
Conservative opinions/religion      
= 1 if belongs to any religion now; =0 otherwise 0.45 0.5 0 1 0.46 0.44  
=1 if sex before marriage always, mostly or 
sometimes wrong; =0 otherwise 
0.15 0.36 0 1 
0.13 0.15  
=1 if sex between 2 men always, mostly or 
sometimes wrong; =0 otherwise 
0.54 0.5 0 1 
0.52 0.55  
=1 if abortion always or mostly wrong; =0 otherwise 0.3 0.46 0 1 0.27 0.3 * 
Age at first het. intercourse        
Aged 13-15 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.34 0.24 *** 
Aged 16-17 0.38 0.49 0 1 0.32 0.39 *** 
Aged 18-19 0.2 0.4 0 1 0.19 0.2  
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Aged 20+ 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.15 0.16  
Parent's professional status      
=1 if professional/managerial; =0 otherwise 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.18 0.17   
=1 if technical/managerial; =0 otherwise 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.24 0.17 *** 
=1 if skilled manual or non-manual; =0 otherwise 0.38 0.49 0 1 0.36 0.39  
=1 if other; =0 otherwise  0.26 0.44 0 1 0.23 0.27 ** 
        
Dependent variable       
=1 if ever paid for sex; =0 otherwise 0.13 0.34 0 1 1 0  
Other for the parent's professional status includes partly skilled, unskilled, unemployed and unclassifiable 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; significantly different between client and non-client  
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Table 2: Probit estimates on 3084 British men: Average Marginal Effects  
Dependent variable=1 if ever paid for sex; =0 otherwise. All 
No 
education 
No 
Professional 
Status 
Age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Number of children -0.014** -0.015** -0.014** 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Education dummies   
=1 if degree level qualification; =0 otherwise  0.070***  0.048** 
 [0.023]  [0.021] 
= 1 if a-levels/as-levels/slc higher grade; =0 otherwise 0.081***  0.069*** 
 [0.023]  [0.023] 
=1 if o-level/other; =0 otherwise 0.042**  0.036** 
 [0.018]  [0.018] 
Professional status   
=1 if professional/managerial; =0 otherwise -0.094*** -0.069**  
 [0.033] [0.032]  
=1 if technical/managerial; =0 otherwise -0.077*** -0.055**  
 [0.027] [0.026]  
=1 if skilled manual or non-manual; =0 otherwise -0.062** -0.055**  
 [0.026] [0.025]  
=1 if partly skilled; =0 otherwise -0.041 -0.039  
 [0.029] [0.029]  
Risky behavior   
=1 if had partner outside UK in the last 5 years; =0 otherwise 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
=1 if had unsafe het. sex in last year; =0 otherwise 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
=1 if ever a smoker; =0 otherwise 0.021* 0.016 0.023* 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] 
=1 if ever injected drugs or other substances; =0 otherwise 0.063** 0.060** 0.062** 
 [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] 
=1 if high or medium alcohol consumption; =0 otherwise 0.037** 0.037** 0.036** 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
Free sex    
Number of new het. sex partners, last year 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Number of occasions of het. sex in last 4 weeks -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
=1 if married or cohabiting or widow or divorced;  -0.016 -0.019 -0.02 
=0 if single & never married [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
Conservative opinions/religion  
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= 1 if belongs to any religion now; =0 otherwise 0.015 0.018 0.014 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] 
=1 if sex before marriage always, mostly or sometimes wrong; =0 otherwise -0.003 0 -0.001 
 [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
=1 if sex between 2 men always, mostly or sometimes wrong; =0 otherwise 0.007 0.002 0.009 
 [0.013] [0.012] [0.013] 
=1 if abortion always or mostly wrong; =0 otherwise -0.006 -0.009 -0.005 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
Age at first het. intercourse    
Aged 13-15 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.053*** 
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
Aged 18-19 0.004 0.008 0.004 
 [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] 
Aged 20+ 0.007 0.011 0.009 
 [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
Parent's professional status  
=1 if professional/managerial; =0 otherwise 0.01 0.022 0.007 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
=1 if technical/managerial; =0 otherwise 0.037* 0.047** 0.033* 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
=1 if skilled manual or non-manual; =0 otherwise 0.005 0.009 0.005 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] 
Observations 3,084 3,084 3,084 
Log likelihood -1071 -1078 -1077 
LR Chi2 233 219.1 222.9 
pseudo r-squared 0.0981 0.0922 0.0938 
Standard errors in brackets  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Base category: No education, No skilled, Aged 16-17,  other 
 
Table 3: Multinomial Probit Results of Non-Clients (2,685 men), Experimenters (165 men) and 
Regulars (234 men): Average Marginal Effects 
  Never paid for sex Experimenter Regular 
Age -0.005*** 0.001 0.004*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Number of children 0.014** -0.005 -0.009* 
 [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] 
Education dummies   
=1 if degree level qualification; =0 otherwise  -0.071*** 0.016 0.055*** 
 [0.023] [0.016] [0.018] 
= 1 if a-levels/as-levels/slc higher grade; =0 otherwise -0.079*** 0.035** 0.044** 
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 [0.023] [0.016] [0.019] 
=1 if o-level/other; =0 otherwise -0.042** 0.012 0.030** 
 [0.018] [0.012] [0.015] 
Professional status   
=1 if professional/managerial; =0 otherwise 0.096*** -0.035 -0.061** 
 [0.034] [0.025] [0.025] 
=1 if technical/managerial; =0 otherwise 0.077*** -0.019 -0.058*** 
 [0.027] [0.019] [0.021] 
=1 if skilled manual or non-manual; =0 otherwise 0.062** -0.01 -0.052*** 
 [0.026] [0.018] [0.019] 
=1 if partly skilled; =0 otherwise 0.041 0.005 -0.046** 
 [0.029] [0.020] [0.022] 
Risky behavior   
=1 if had partner outside UK in the last 5 years; =0 otherwise -0.121*** 0.035*** 0.086*** 
 [0.015] [0.010] [0.011] 
=1 if had unsafe het. sex in last year; =0 otherwise -0.060*** 0.030** 0.029* 
 [0.020] [0.013] [0.016] 
=1 if ever a smoker; =0 otherwise -0.02 0.022*** -0.002 
 [0.012] [0.008] [0.010] 
=1 if ever injected drugs or other substances; =0 otherwise -0.061** 0.008 0.054*** 
 [0.028] [0.020] [0.021] 
=1 if high or medium alcohol consumption; =0 otherwise -0.038** 0.008 0.030** 
 [0.016] [0.011] [0.012] 
Free sex    
Number of new het. sex partners, last year 0.002** -0.002** 0 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Number of occasions of het. sex in last 4 weeks -0.011** -0.011** -0.012** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
=1 if married or cohabiting or widow or divorced;  0.016 -0.005 -0.011 
=0 if single & never married [0.015] [0.010] [0.012] 
Conservative opinions/religion  
= 1 if belongs to any religion now; =0 otherwise -0.016 0.011 0.004 
 [0.012] [0.008] [0.010] 
=1 if sex before marriage always, mostly or sometimes wrong; =0 otherwise 0.005 -0.022 0.017 
 [0.019] [0.014] [0.014] 
=1 if sex between 2 men always, mostly or sometimes wrong; =0 otherwise -0.007 0.001 0.006 
 [0.013] [0.009] [0.010] 
=1 if abortion always or mostly wrong; =0 otherwise 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 
 [0.014] [0.009] [0.011] 
Age at first het. intercourse    
Aged 13-15 -0.051*** 0.008 0.044*** 
 [0.015] [0.010] [0.012] 
Aged 18-19 -0.005 -0.017 0.022* 
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 [0.017] [0.012] [0.013] 
Aged 20+ -0.006 -0.019 0.026* 
 [0.019] [0.014] [0.014] 
Parent's professional status  
=1 if professional/managerial; =0 otherwise -0.011 0.029** -0.018 
 [0.019] [0.014] [0.014] 
=1 if technical/managerial; =0 otherwise -0.038** 0.028** 0.01 
 [0.019] [0.013] [0.015] 
=1 if skilled manual or non-manual; =0 otherwise -0.005 0.008 -0.003 
 [0.014] [0.009] [0.012] 
Observations 3,084 3,084 3,084 
Log likelihood -1071 -1078 -1077 
LR Chi2 233 219.1 222.9 
pseudo r-squared 0.0981 0.0922 0.0938 
Standard errors in brackets  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Base category: No education, No skilled, Aged 16-17,  other 
 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
Table A1: descriptive statistics for the total number of people paid for sex. 
 
 
  Freq. Percent 
0 2,685 87.06 
1 165 5.35 
2 74 2.4 
3 48 1.56 
4 25 0.81 
5 22 0.71 
6 15 0.49 
7 12 0.39 
8 8 0.26 
10 9 0.29 
12 4 0.13 
15 3 0.1 
20 6 0.19 
21 2 0.06 
25 2 0.06 
32 1 0.03 
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40 1 0.03 
50 1 0.03 
150 1 0.03 
      
Total 3,084 100 
 
 
Table A2: Correlation matrix between Professional status and educational levels. 
 
  Degree level A-level  O-level/other None 
Professional/managerial 0.3680* -0.0622* -0.1936* -0.1314* 
Managerial/technical 0.2935* 0.1125* -0.1708* -0.2213* 
Skilled -0.3263* -0.0243 0.2186* 0.1228* 
Part skilled -0.1772* -0.0500* 0.0736* 0.1568* 
Unskilled -0.1289* -0.0343* 0.027 0.1471* 
 
 
 
Table A3: Descriptive statistics of select variables by professional status 
 
 Professional managerial/technical Skilled 
Part 
skilled  Unskilled Total 
Number of occasions of het. sex in last 4 weeks 5.24 5.18 5.52 4.72 5.48 5.28 
Number of new het. sex partners, last year 0.43 0.49 0.59 0.63 0.57 0.54 
=1 if married or cohabiting or widow or 
divorced;  0.70 0.73 0.72 0.65 0.65 0.71 
Age at first het. intercourse              
Aged 13-15 0.094 0.191 0.309 0.364 0.402 0.260 
Aged 16-17 0.351 0.388 0.395 0.341 0.360 0.381 
Aged 18-19 0.247 0.243 0.166 0.171 0.091 0.197 
Aged 20+ 0.308 0.178 0.130 0.124 0.146 0.162 
 
 
